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SEXUAL MINORITIES AND ASYLUM LAW: SOME DOORS REMAIN UNOPENED
NICK CORSANO

INTRODUCTION
Sexual and gender minorities have consistently been left out, over-looked or
simply forgotten when protections from discrimination are afforded to particular social
groups. Whether it was because of disapproval or lack of visibility, gender and sexual
minorities have not been socially accepted to constitute people who can be defined within
the clear-cut confines of a particular group. Immigration law did not fail to follow suit in
lacking the adequate definitions and enumerations to protect sexual and gender minorities
seeking asylum.
The Immigration and Nationality Act enumerates quite a few social groups whose
members can claim asylum if they are persecuted for their membership or association
within that group.1 Not completely unaware that there may be groups of people that do
not fall under one of the enumerated categories, the Immigration and Nationality Act
allows for members of “a particular social group” to claim asylum if he or she can prove
their membership was or will be the source of their persecution.2 This is the gateway
group for sexual and gender minorities to claim asylum for persecution based on this
characteristic.
Sexual and gender minority is not met with ease in defining what would constitute
a particular social group. Through an order by the Attorney General defining gays and
lesbians as a protected “particular social group” in 1990 and a few defining cases handed

1
2

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778 (2010).
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(1), (b)(1) (2003).
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down by the circuit courts, have caused “a particular social group” to slowly but
sufficiently broadened itself to incorporate sexual and gender minorities.3
These cases demonstrate a developing jurisprudence for the protection of asylum
seekers based on sexual and gender minorities persecuted for the immutable and/or innate
characteristics expressed as integral parts of their identities. However, they also bring to
light the difficulties surrounding the protection of an innate, yet non-physical
characteristic. As cases involving sexual and gender minorities that display outward
manifestations of their “particular social group” are easier in a sense to evaluate, the
immigration courts stifle when dealing with individuals who possess the immutable
characteristic but don’t exhibit outward manifestations.4 The courts attempted to remedy
these situations by stating that evidence of past persecution will automatically instill a
valid fear of future persecution and denial may only be granted on proof of evidence to
change of circumstances offered proved the government.5 This does not provide a
solution however for those individuals who fail to have a past experience of persecution,
but are still in danger due to their membership in the particular social group of sexual or
gender minority.
In order to remedy the problems of persecution facing sexual and gender
minorities the courts have attempted to interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act in a
favorable light to allow for those persecuted on the basis of a non-physical characteristic.
This Note will examine the interactions of sexual and gender minorities with asylum law
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Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2004); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328
F.3d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2003); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir.
2000); Opinion of Attorney General Order no. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994).
4
In re Soto Vega, No. A-9880786, at 3 (Immigration Ct. Jan. 21, 2003).
5
Vega v. Gonzalez, 183 Fed. Appx. 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2006).
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and the expansions and contractions taken in establishing standards for the granting or
denial of asylum for persecution based on membership in a “particular social group.”
Part I examines the foundations of asylum law and its applications. Part II looks over the
considerations and reasoning behind the circuit split in defining what constitutes a
particular social group. Part III discusses the circuit split over whether punitive intent is
necessary for whether treatment of an individual constitutes persecution. Part IV
discusses homosexuality defined as a particular social group. Part V discusses the
difficulties in defining transsexual and transgender as a particular social group. Part V
also looks at the ideas of soft immutability and the Imputed Identity Doctrine. Part VI
examines the importance of physical manifestation when determining an individual’s
membership in a particular social group. Part VI also discusses the ideas of covering and
reverse covering. Throughout the Note there will be analysis of the procedural and
policy precedents in place and their affect on sexual and gender minorities seeking
asylum, concluding that courts should hold firm to practices that allow for the protection
of those persecuted because of an actual or perceived immutable or innate characteristic
core to their identity, regardless of how well their “particular social group” can be
defined.

I. ASYLUM LAW: DEFINITION AND PRACTICE
Asylum claims in the United States are governed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).6 The Department of Homeland Security and the Justice
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8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778 (2010); Stephen Yale-Loehr, Sean Koehler, Overview of the U.S.
Immigration Law, 139 PLI/NY 11, 16-17 (2004).
3

Department govern the INA regulations.7 When granted asylum the alien may be eligible
for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to § 209 of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1159, after residing in the United States one year,
subject to numerical limitation and the applicable regulations.8 The regulations prescribe
that when the alien applies for an adjustment to “permanent resident,” he or she has to
have been physically present in the United States for at least one year after being granted
asylum, continued to be a refugee within the meaning of Section 101(a)(42)(A), 8 USCS
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)9 or as a spouse or child of such a refugee, is not firmly resettled in any
foreign country, and is admissible as an immigrant under this Act at the time of
examination for adjustment of the alien.10
Cases of asylum are heard first in the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR).11 If the immigration judge finds that removal of the applicant is proper, the
applicant may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).12 An individual
member of the BIA is authorized to affirm the decision of an immigration judge without
opinion if he or she determines that any errors that may exist in the decisions are
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8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1778; Koehler, supra note 6, at 16-17.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987).

The term "refugee" means:
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2010).
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8 U.S.C § 1159(b)(1)-(5) (2005).
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
th
AND POLICY 254, 256 (4 ed. 1998).
12
8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (2003).
11
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“harmless or nonmaterial,” or the issue on appeal is “squarely controlled by existing
Board or federal court precedent,” or that the “questions raised on appeal are so
insubstantial” that a panel is unnecessary.13 Finally, if the BIA denies the application, the
applicant may raise their case on appeal to the federal circuit court for review in the
circuit in which they are located.14 When the BIA issues an opinion that does not adopt
the decision of an immigration judge, the BIA’s opinion becomes the basis for judicial
review of the decision of which the alien is complaining. 15 Though the federal court has
the ability to clarify the law, they cannot define factually what does or does not constitute
asylum eligibility regarding an administrative judgment.16
A court of appeals reviewing an asylum claim is not generally empowered to
conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter and reach its own conclusions based on that
inquiry; proper conduct, except in rare circumstances, would be for the court to remand
back to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.17 The agency (BIA) is
entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA.18 If the appeal to
the Court of Appeals is successful, the court’s decision is then binding on the BIA and
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8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) (2003).
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2003).
15
Fen Yong Chen v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 470 F.3d 509, 513 (2d
Cir. 2006); Board of Immigration Appeals, JUSTICE.GOV,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm, (last updated April 2011).
16
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006).
17
Id.
18
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 522 (2009). This course of remand will play an
integral role in the progression of asylum cases regarding homosexuals, as the BIA is the
agency that ultimately should define what does, or does not constitute a “particular group
of society.”
14
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lower immigration judges for cases that arise within that circuit.19 Only a decision from
the Supreme Court would affect all immigration courts, but they infrequently give
certiorari to immigration cases.
The Attorney General has the authority to overrule decisions of the BIA and can
establish clarity among the law, by determining what should be held as precedent.20
Federal Regulations permit the Attorney General to intervene in the appeals process by
certifying a BIA decision to himself, or by accepting referral from the Board or the
Department of Homeland Security.21 Once the referral has been made to the Attorney
General, the BIA decision is no longer final and cannot be used as precedent or reviewed
by a federal court.22 The decisions issued by the Attorney General in these instances
become the final agency decision and serve as precedent, binding future cases.23
Asylum may be initiated in two manners. A “defensive application” for asylum
occurs when removal proceedings24 have begun and the alien raises an asylum claim as
grounds for relief from deportation.25 Conversely, as the name suggests, an “affirmative
application” for asylum occurs when the applicant is legally present and makes his or her
claim outright in order to obtain asylum status.26 Regarding persecution based on sexual

19

Stuart Frider, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States – In re
Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35 HARV. INT’L L.J.
213, 215 (1994).
20
8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (2003).
21
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2008).
22
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1); Attorney General Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001)
(attached to E-L-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 700, 701 (AG 2004)).
23
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2008).
24
Removal proceedings are governed and defined by I.N.A. 239, 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 12291229(a) (2003).
25
Vicente A. Tome, Administrative Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum
Adjudication, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411, 423 (1994).
26
Id. at 422-23.
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orientation or gender, whether asylum is raised as a “defensive” or an “affirmative”
measure should have no impact on deciding whether to grant asylum or not. Using the
manner in which asylum is sought to rebut the validity of the claim based on sexual
orientation or gender would be inappropriate given the lack of clarity in the application of
this “particular social group” as it is.
Under Title 8, an alien has to prove that race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group, or political opinion, was or will be at least one central reason for
which he or she was or will be persecuted.27 The United States Supreme Court has
established a two-step process for reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute. First,
if the congressional purpose is clear, courts and administrative agencies must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.28 The second level of review is
triggered when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.29
When the statute is silent the court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. 30
Evidentiary support is essential to establishing that one was or will be subjected to
persecution. The BIA laid out in the Matter of Acosta that in order for the alien to show
that it is likely he will become the victim of persecution, his evidence must demonstrate
that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to extinguish in
others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could
easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the
persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the
27

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2003).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
29
Id. at 843.
30
Id. at 844.
28
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inclination to punish the alien.31 In addition, the statutory standard for asylum requires
the facts to show that an alien’s primary motivation for requesting refuge in the United
States is “fear,” i.e., a genuine apprehension or awareness of danger in another country.32
The requirement of a “well-founded fear of persecution,” set out by section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, has been interpreted by the BIA to mean that an individual’s
fear of persecution must have its basis in external, or objective, facts that show there is a
realistic likelihood he will be persecuted upon his return to a particular country.33 This
requires that the alien show his fear has a solid basis in objective facts or events and that
it is likely he will become the victim of persecution.34
The “well-founded fear of persecution” standard involves both a subjectively
genuine fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable possibility of persecution.35
The subjective component requires that the applicant have a genuine concern that he or
she will be persecuted, and may be satisfied by the applicant’s testimony that he or she
genuinely fears persecution.36 The objective component requires that the alien establish a
reasonable fear of persecution by credible, direct, and specific evidence.37 The applicant
is not however required to present proof that the persecution is more likely than not; one
can have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50 percent
chance of the occurrence taking place.38

31

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (B.I.A. 1985).
Id. at 221.
33
Id. at 225.
34
Id.
35
Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
36
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1997).
37
Id.
38
Id.
32
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To satisfy the objective prong of having a well-founded fear of future persecution,
an applicant must show that he would be individually singled out for persecution or
demonstrate that there is a pattern or practice in his country of persecution of a group of
persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.39 The immigration judge
shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that he would be singled out
individually for persecution if he establishes his inclusion in and identification with
similarly situated groups of persons against which there is a pattern or practice of
persecution in his country on account of the five statutory grounds for asylum.40 It is
therefore inappropriate to delve into the subjective levels of the person’s individual
experience with a particular social group, if there is clear evidence that the applicant does
in fact belong to the persecuted particular group.
In the Matter of Acosta, the BIA interpreted persecution of this kind to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic; one that might be innate such as
sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience
such as former military leadership or land ownership.41 No matter what the common
characteristic, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences.42

39

Vasquez-Ramirez v. Attorney General United States, 315 Fed. Appx. 381, 382 (3rd Cir.
2009).
40
Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994).
41
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-234.
42
Id.
9

In applying the Acosta formula, the BIA focuses on the two major considerations
of immutability and social visibility.43 The BIA has noted that a past experience is by its
very nature, immutable.44 The event has already occurred and cannot be undone;
however, this fact does not mean that any past experience shared by people suffices to
define a particular social group for asylum purposes.45 The Agency is careful to police its
interpretation of the “particular social group” so not to over broaden the requirements
necessary to obtain asylum. “Particular social group” should not be a “catch all” for all
persons alleging asylum that do not fit within another enumerated category.46 This means
that the risk of persecution alone does not create a particular social group within the
meaning of the INA.47
II. THE THREEWAY SPLIT OVER A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced that Toboso-Alfonso would act
as precedent for all cases concerning the same or similar issues.48 The case stated an
“individual who has been identified as a homosexual and persecuted by his government
for that reason alone may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of
persecution because of membership in a particular social group.”49 The Attorney General
ordered that this opinion act as precedent in all proceedings involving issues relating to
all sexual orientation claims.50 The new standard lead to the three-ways circuit split that

43

Castillo-Arias v. United States Attorney General, 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1198.
47
Id.
48
Opinion of Attorney General Order No. 1895- 94 (June 19, 1994).
49
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I.&N. Dec. 819, 819 n.1 (B.I.A. 1990).
50
Opinion of Attorney General Order No. 1895- 94.
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has evolved in evaluating what constitutes a particular social group, especially when
dealing with non-physical, immutable or innate characteristics.
The First Circuit,51 Third Circuit,52 and Seventh Circuit,53 have all followed the
standard set out by the BIA in Acosta in determining a member of a “particular social
group” when reviewing applications for asylum. The guidelines set out above are what
these Circuits adhere to, and they aim to determine if the persecution is because of
membership in a particular social group, whose members share a common, immutable
characteristic.54 The First Circuit, while adhering to the standard laid out in Acosta,
narrowed the standard a bit more in their analysis by emphasizing another section of the
INA. Even if an alien asserts a fear of future persecution by local functionaries, they
must show that those functionaries have more than a localized reach.55 The reasoning is
that if the potentially troublesome state of affairs is sufficiently localized, an alien can
avoid persecution by simply relocating within his own country instead of fleeing to a
foreign nation.56 The Immigration and BIA courts within these three circuits are held to
the standard those circuits and must review asylum cases in that light; here strict
adherence to the guidelines of the BIA and Acosta.
The Ninth Circuit has evolved a more liberal take on the standard set out in
Acosta. Initially, laying out its opinion in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the court defined
“particular social group” as a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who

51

Da Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
52
Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 719.
53
Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1998).
54
Da Silva, 394 F.3d at 5.
55
Id. at 7.
56
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2); Da Silva, 394 F.3d at 7.
11

are associated by some common impulse or interest.57 The central vein of the court’s
concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported
members, which expresses some common characteristic that is fundamental to their
identity as a member of that discrete social group.58 The Ninth Circuit has turned its
attention towards the associational relationship involving “common
characteristics…fundamental…to identity.”59 The court speaks to the ability of
persecution to not only occur based on an immutable characteristic, but also to an
association, one fundamental to the identity and core of the applicant’s person. In dealing
with applications based on sexual orientation, the Ninth Circuit opens itself up to the
allowance of those who share a common characteristic that may not be immutable but is
core to their person none-the-less. Though the Attorney General stated, Toboso- Alfonso
is precedent, there are subsets of gender identity that are not as clearly defined as the
homosexuality reviewed in that case. Those subsets will now have a more reasonable
chance of success under the altered standard of the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit moved on from Sanchez-Trujillo to Hernandez-Montiel v. INS,
where the court harmonized the previous case with the standard set forth in Acosta. The
court expands the definition of “particular social group” in Hernandez-Montiel to include
“one united by a voluntary association…or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its member that members cannot or should
not be required to change it.”60 This standard encompasses the immutable characteristic
standard laid out in Acosta, but broadens itself to encompass things not necessarily
57

Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093.
12

immutable, but crucial to a person’s identity none-the-less. This broadened standard
makes asylum more accessible to the LGBT community. There are subsets and intricacies
involved in sexual orientation and gender identity that possess qualities not necessarily
immutable, but unchangeable and innate to the individual, suggesting that they should not
be required to be changed.
Lastly, the Second Circuit removes analysis from the individual claiming asylum
and observes the actions and objectives of his or her persecutor. The Second Circuit
focuses its opinion around perception in Gomez v. INS. The idea of perception opens the
claim of asylum to a broader range of victims, who would otherwise rely solely on
establishing that they are part of a particular social group based on an immutable
characteristic or a characteristic so innate they should not be required to change it. In
Gomez, the Second Circuit defined “particular social group” as one “comprised of
individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of the persecutor…or in the eyes of the outside world in
general.”61 This standard removes the claim from a basis of actual identity, to one of
perceived identity, which in many cases is the basis for persecution or victimization to
begin with; which other statutes in the United States allow for, holding the attacker
equally as culpable as if their persecution was based on actual, rather than perceived
knowledge.62 The standard upheld by the Second Circuit opens up asylum claims to
those that would otherwise be at a loss. People persecuted because of their perceived

61

Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act outlaws sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace; sexual orientation being defined as homosexuality, bisexuality, or
heterosexuality, whether the orientation is real or perceived. H.R. 2981 § 3(a)(9), 111th
Cong. (2009).
62
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identity may in fact not identify as a member of that group and do not have the
immutable characteristics of those being persecuted. Should they be denied asylum and
forced to endure persecution because of an inaccuracy? The Second Circuit says no.
This standard facilitates a means for a great deal of subsets in the LGBT community,
specifically among the transsexuals and transgender individuals. Something as difficult
to explain as transexuality, can be even more difficult when forced to contextualize not
only what you are but how you, among others, are persecuted for it. The standard of the
Second Circuit allows a bit of leniency to the victim as they are not required to clarify
what they are and how they are part of a “particular social group,” but only that their
attacker perceives them as such, which usually will fall more smoothly into the binary
sexual system laid out in the United States.
III. PUNITIVE INTENT OR NOT?
The idea of whether an asylum applicant’s persecutor must have acted with
punitive intent has caused a split among the circuits. At least two circuits uphold the idea
in Matter of Acosta that persecutors must exhibit intent to punish in order for asylum to
be granted.63 Sivaainkaran v. INS, from the Seventh Circuit, involved the denial of
asylum for a Sri Lankan Applicant because the court felt his situation didn’t merit asylum
simply because he feared harassment from the conflict between the Buddhist Sinhalese
and the Hindu/Muslim Tamils.64 The court said that persecution has been described as
“punishment” or “the infliction of harm” for political, religious, or other offensive
reasons.65

63

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F. 2d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1992).
65
Id.
64
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However, in certain circumstances, denial of a privilege in a home country for
legitimate reasons does not escalate to persecution. The Fifth Circuit handed down
Faddoul v INS, where they refused to grant asylum to a Palestinian applicant alleging
persecution in Saudi Arabia.66 The applicant alleged that he and his family were denied
basic living, citizenship, and exit/ re-entry ability in Saudi Arabia.67 The court noted that
all non-Saudi residents were subject to the same lack of privileges and that this particular
applicant failed to show that he and his family were being isolated for persecution.68
Additionally, Faddoul failed to show he feared harm as a result of the Saudis’ desire to
punish him for a particular belief or characteristic; resulting in denial of asylum.69
The Ninth Circuit deviates from the “intent to punish” standard. In Pitcherskaia
v. INS, Pitcherskaia was a registered70, suspected lesbian and was ordered to undergo
treatment at a clinic. She was diagnosed with “slow-going schizophrenia” and prescribed
sedatives.71 Applicant was arrested twice in the home of a gay friend in 1990 and 1991
and imprisoned overnight.72 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA, the
Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuits view on what constitutes persecution.73 The Ninth
Circuit held that “persecution” is defined objectively as “the infliction of suffering or
harm upon those who differ… in a way regarded as offensive.”74 Therefore, the
subjective motives of the persecutor are irrelevant, for “persecution by any other name

66

Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id.
68
Id. at 189.
69
Id.
70
In Russia, the government kept records of suspected homosexuals during the 1990’s.
71
Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d at 644.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 648.
74
Id. at 647, (citing Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997).
67
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remains persecution.”75 The Ninth Circuit remanded the applicant’s case to the BIA,
stating; “human rights law cannot be sidestepped by simply couching actions that torture
mentally or physically in benevolent terms such as ‘curing’ or ‘treating’ the victims.”76
As observed previously, this is now precedent in immigration courts that lie within the
Ninth Circuit. Their applicants will have the objective, reasonable person standard,
removing the protection of misleading terms that may hide the true subjective nature of
the persecutor’s intent.
IV. HOMOSEXUALITY AS A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP UNDER
ASYLUM LAW

Until 1990, homosexuals were formally excluded on the grounds that they were
“aliens afflicted with a psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or mental defect.”77 The
Immigration Act of 1990 removed the bar on admission for homosexuals into the United
States.78 In 1990, in Toboso-Alfonso, a homosexual was deemed a member of a
particular social group, specifically Cuban gays, and the applicant was permitted to
successfully allege persecution on that basis to qualify under the statutory definition of
refugee in Section 101 of the INA.79 Subsequent to Toboso-Alfonso, was the case of In re
Tenorio, decided in 1993, the court granted asylum to a Brazilian gay man who feared
persecution by paramilitary groups after having been bashed in Rio de Janeiro.80 In both
cases homosexuality served as the basis for claiming membership to a particular social

75

Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
77
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919
(1965) (superceded 1990).
78
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067-77 (1990).
79
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823.
80
In re Tenorio, No. A72-093-558 (Immigration Ct. July 26, 1993).
76
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group subject to persecution.81 However, neither case was assigned precedence at the
time it was decided.82
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a directive, mandating that the
immigration system adopt Toboso-Alfonso as precedent “in all proceedings involving the
same issue or issues.”83 The Attorney General held that “an individual who has been
identified as a homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone
may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution because of
membership in a particular social group.”84 Since the adoption of Toboso-Alfonso, the
hurdle for gays and lesbians to establish themselves as part of a particular social group
has been removed by the determination that homosexuality is in fact, a particular social
group. However, though gays and lesbians may associate themselves as part of a
particular social group (sexual and gender minorities) they must still demonstrate the
subjective and objective fears of persecution required by Matter of Acosta.85 They must
show a nexus between the persecutions they have suffered, or their fear they will suffer
persecution and their membership to their particular social group (sexual minorities).86
The Mogharrabi test holds that an alien’s fear is reasonable if a reasonable person in a
similar circumstance would fear future persecution.87 Though still faced with the task of
proving fear of persecution or that of future persecution, gays and lesbians no longer have
81

In re Tenorio, No. A72-093-558; Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823;
Erik D. Ramanthan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of Global Sexual OrientationBased Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22 (1996).
82
In re Tenorio, No. A72-093-558; Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 823;
Ramanthan, supra note 81, at 20-21.
83
Attorney General Order No. 1895-94, 859, 860 (June 19, 1994).
84
Id.
85
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 226.
86
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2010).
87
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987).
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to worry about proving where they fit in regards to a “particular social group.”88 This is
still not the case however for those among other sexual and gender minority groups.
V. DIFFICULTY IN DEFING TRANSEXUALS AND BISEXUALS UNDER
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP”

In the case of transsexual and transgender individuals, the argument for asylum
becomes more difficult. Though Attorney General Janet Reno affirmed that
homosexuality does constitute a particular social group upon which asylum claims may
be based and that Toboso-Alfonso should be adopted as precedent for all cases regarding
the same issue or issues; 89 the courts have not extended this to mean those individuals
who identify under the headings of transsexual or transgender. The BIA has never
formally recognized transgender or transsexuals as a “particular social group,” and no
federal circuit has defined the standard regarding these individuals directly. However,
the Ninth Circuit has issued two decisions that contribute to the protection for
transgender/sexual asylum seekers. In Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft,
the Ninth Circuit established that “gay men with female sexual identities” comport a
particular social group,90 and then broadly defined this group to encompass a variety of
gender-based characteristics, consecutively.91 These cases are important because they do
not just gauge these individuals against the particular social group of homosexuality, but
that of what they really are- sexual minorities. They establish precedent for the equal
protection and opportunity to gain asylum for those that don’t conform to stereotypical
gender norms.
88
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Hernandez-Montiel v. INS is a case from the Ninth Circuit issued in 2000.92 The
decision in this case extended protection to Hernandez-Montiel, a transgender asylum
seeker.93 Hernandez-Montiel wore his hair long, had long fingernails, dressed in
women’s clothing, took female hormones and had same-sex attraction.94 HernandezMontiel claimed that he should be considered as a member of a particular social group –
gay men with female sexual identities.95
Initially, the Immigration Judge, though finding Hernandez-Montiel credible and
sincere, denied relief because “homosexual males who wish to dress as a woman” did not
constitute a particular social group.96 The Immigration Judge noted that he could not
characterize Hernandez-Montiel’s assumed female persona as immutable or fundamental
to his identity because he alternated between it and his male identity.97 The BIA affirmed
the Immigration Judge’s decision, and found that Hernandez-Montiel faced persecution
not because of his homosexuality but “because of the way he dressed (as a male
prostitute)” and that “his decision to dress as a female” was not an immutable
characteristic.98
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the BIA.99 The court laid its
foundation in establishing the existing precedent, that gays and lesbians are members of a
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particular social group.100 The court then continued on to note that “sexual identity goes
beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often through dress and
appearance.”101 The court observed that men who are homosexual in many cases,
“outwardly manifest their identities through characteristics traditionally associated with
women, such as feminine dress, long hair and fingernails.”102 The court noted that these
men may suffer the most serious persecution in certain cultures because they are not only
homosexual, but additionally they adopt the passive role in the gay relationship, the one
perceived to be the stereotypical female role.103 The court recognized HernandezMontiel as a “homosexual who has taken on a primarily ‘female’ sexual role.”104 The
court described Hernandez-Montiel as part of the particular social group- “gay men with
female sexual identities.”105 The court said that Hernandez-Montiel was not a case about
a man who on occasion puts on a dress to engage in “cross-dressing;” but a case about
“sexual identity,” manifested in the adoption of gendered traits characteristically
associated with women.106 The sexual identity discussed here that manifests in traits
characteristically associated with women, also manifests itself in traits characteristically
associated with transsexuals. Though the female is the binary category within which
these traits fall stereotypically, it must also be remembered that these traits are the innate
traits of the transgender/transsexual. They are just as much core characteristics of the
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transsexual as they are of the female and this is the recognition and equation the court has
not yet reached.
Though the court never uses the term transsexual or transgender, the Ninth Circuit
provides opportunity in asylum cases to this group of sexual minorities. The court
described these individuals as “gay men with female sexual identities.”107 The court
makes a statement in saying that sexual identities cannot be as binary as they have been
perceived in the past. Sexual identifications cannot be as clear-cut as to fit nicely in the
package that has been established- homosexuality. Hernandez-Montiel states “sexual
identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often through dress
and appearance.”108 Sexual identification is more than just intercourse as the court
describes, that is only a piece to the puzzle, which as a whole is identity. Identity is
expressed in a multitude of ways. One example expressed here is dress.109 The dress is
not merely to be taken as protection from the elements or as the court describes, “a
fashion statement.”110 It is a statement or expression generally of who that person is, the
identity they hold, and an outward manifestation of the internal immutable characteristics
that classify them a person, a person whose identity deserves protection from persecution.
Many groups in society can be classified by their clothing; Goths, Hipsters, Grunge.
Each of these “particular social groups,” dress in a certain way that make them
identifiable to the public and to each other. Their clothing is an extension and
representation of the beliefs that are core to their identity. If ever persecuted for these
beliefs, they hold the necessary requirements for an asylum claim, and it seems that the
107
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Ninth Circuit held correctly that the outer manifestation or representation of one’s
internal identity should not be taken so lightly simply because it is removable.
In Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit expanded the borders of “gay men
with female sexual identities.”111 The court noted that the application of this social group
extends to a man who “dresses and looks like a woman, wears makeup and a women’s
hairstyle.”112 The counsel in Reyes-Reyes referred to Reyes-Reyes as “transgender,”
which provided the court the opportunity to redefine, or fuse the concept of transgender
with the broader definition of “gay men with female sexual identities.”113 The court did
not avoid referring to Reyes-Reyes as a transgender individual, they noted that ReyesReyes’s “sexual orientation, for which he was targeted and his transsexual behavior are
intimately connected.”114 Combined with the decision of Hernandez-Montiel, ReyesReyes extends protections under asylum law to those individuals persecuted for their
sexual identities manifested “beyond conduct, and outwardly expressed through dress and
appearance.”115
A. The Soft Immutability Standard
Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes impose a “soft immutability” standard that
alters the way in which courts protect the transgender or sexual minority asylum
seeker.116 The soft immutability standard that is established in these cases from the Ninth
Circuit reduce the need for “scientific or biological” proof of sexual identity through
111
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static characteristics by way of chromosomal makeup, sex organs, or the sexual identity
assigned at birth.117 This standard allows for transgender asylum seekers to seek
protection based on traits adopted over time though still integral to their identity.118 They
expand the definition of what might constitute “immutable.”119 The court’s lenient
interpretation of immutability allows for individuals to establish identity through traits
that accurately and fairly represent their identities without biological or scientific
support.120 The Ninth Circuit interprets broadly the original definition of a particular
social group with this standard, which protects the aspects of identity that a person
“cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences.”121
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the latter part of this standard in the proper light.
The dress, actions and outward traits and expressions of these individuals are
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences and therefore should not be
required to be changed. Political association and religious views are protected, nonphysical traits that can constitute a membership to a particular social group, yet their
outward physical expressions of association are removable. If an individual goes to bed
without his yarmulke or prayer shawl on, does he no longer hold Judaism core to his
identity? If a political activist puts down his flag, has he abandoned his association?
Though missing the opportunity for analogy in these cases, the Ninth Circuit establishes
the precedent when dealing with the particular social group of transgender individuals or
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“gay men with female sexual identities.” Just because they are able to remove their outer
garments, makeup, etc, does not mean that they abandon their fundamental identification
with the particular social group. Nor does it mean they become any less at risk for
persecution based upon their association. Therefore these individuals should be afforded
the same protection as those who conform within the binary categories of gay and
lesbian.
B. The Imputed Identity Doctrine
Though loosening the stronghold on the definition of immutability, the Ninth
Circuit still reviews the identity and characteristic of the persecuted and attempts to find
out if it is core to their person and for which they are persecuted.122 There is a third
standard of review in cases regarding asylum claims based on sexual identity. That third
standard concerns the imputed identity doctrine, which concerns not the asylum seeker’s
identity, but the perceptions and motivations of the persecutor.123 If the persecutor
perceives the individual to be a member of a particular social group and persecutes him
on that basis, the alien’s actual identity is no longer relevant and he or she should be
granted asylum on the beliefs and acts of persecution of the persecutor.124 The Second
Circuit includes imputed identity into its definition of a particular social group.125 In
Gomez v INS the court said, “A particular social group is comprised of individuals

who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor -- or in the eyes of the outside world in
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general.”126 This interpretation of the enumerated category, “particular social
group,” holds important the belief of the persecutor rather than the selfidentification of the alien. The imputed identity doctrine, allows the alien to claim
asylum on what he or she is perceived to be by their persecutor, regardless of
whether they can identify themselves as an actual member of that particular social
group.
The Third Circuit extended imputed identity to sexual-orientation based
claims in Amanfi v. Ashcroft.127 The court reversed a BIA decision that held
imputed identity was limited to political opinion.128 The court held that imputed
gay identity falls squarely under the BIA’s decision in In re S-P, a case that
extended asylum to an applicant who faced persecution on account of his imputed
political views.129 In re S-P- held that “persecution for ‘imputed’ grounds (where
someone is erroneously thought to hold a particular political opinion or mistakenly
believed to be a member of a religious sect) can satisfy the ‘refugee’ definition.”130
The court in Amanfi recognized the doctrine of imputed gay identity relying on the
holding of In re S-P-, and the proposed Attorney General regulation in 2000 that
126
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would extend the imputed identity doctrine to all protected groups across the
board.131
The imputed gay identity doctrine opens the door for asylum claims to a
number of individuals that previously would have been denied. Until this point,
there has been an unrecognized difference between persecution based on
knowledge, and persecution based on perception. Most persecution stems from
the perception of a persecutor and usually continues on this basis because of what
they perceive the person to be. Transgender persons who are persecuted because
of their perceived deviation from gender expectations, and for whom persecution
can be as much a gender-based phenomenon as sexual-orientation-based one, may
now be able to bring a claim under the imputed identity doctrine.132
The idea in itself is not as far fetched as one might think. Our domestic
laws already allow for the perceptions of the bigoted public. The Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act was enacted in 2009.
The act protects against hate crimes performed domestically on account of an
individual’s association with a certain group based on an immutable
131
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characteristic.133 In addition to protecting against bigotry regarding race and color,
the act also enumerates for crimes performed because of sexual orientation and
gender identity.
In general.--Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, in any
circumstance described in subparagraph (B) or paragraph (3), willfully causes
bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous
weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to
any person, because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person-134
The most important language to take note of is “because of actual or perceived.”135 Our
domestic law regarding persecution on account of an immutable or innate characteristic
takes action for those who may not “be” but are merely “perceived to be.” Whether the
crime is performed based on knowledge that the individual is a homosexual or merely
perceived to be; any violent action taken against them is considered a hate crime and
subject to a harsher punishment if found guilty under the law. 136 The fact that our
domestic laws enumerate for crimes based on perception suggests that the imputed
identity doctrine of the Third Circuit is not as far fetched as some may think.
VI. WHAT IS GAY ENOUGH?

133

Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 111 P.L.
84, 4707, Stat. 2190 (2009).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Amanfi involved a claim for asylum by a supposed heterosexual man who, in
believing he had been selected by the “macho men” in his native Ghana to be sacrificed,
engaged in homosexual activity to display his imperfection for sacrifice. His claim of
asylum asserted that he would be persecuted in Ghana not because he would be sacrificed
but rather his perceived homosexuality. The BIA rejected his case on grounds that there
was insubstantial precedent to support an individual who was not himself a homosexual
to qualify for relief under protections extended to gays and lesbians. Amanfi, 328 F. 3d at
721-24.
27

In claims brought for transgender or ambiguously gendered individuals,
advocates should demonstrate how these individuals are marked by their male and
female characteristics and the different ways that their client’s culture places
emphasis on the nexus between a person’s outward appearance and his or her
given sex.137 However, there are dangers regarding outward expression of sexual
orientation. Cases in which individuals are persecuted for their sexual identity or
perceived sexual identity have involved individuals whose sexual identity has been
outwardly represented. Certain defenses have been raised against individuals
whose outward appearance does not represent the stereotypical homosexual
identity. In the Matter of Soto Vega, an immigration judge refused to grant asylum
because the individual’s homosexuality was not manifested through gendered
traits of a homosexual.138 This decision is representative of a trend in immigration
cases to equate visibility with the potential for anti-homosexual persecution.139
The judge noted the credibility of the gay man who feared being returned to
Mexico, but denied him relief because of his apparent non-“obvious” gay
demeanor.140 The judge remarked that he saw nothing in the individual’s
“appearance, dress, manner, demeanor, gestures, voice, or anything of nature that
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approached some of the stereotypical things that society assesses to gays.”141 The
judge noted that the individual “would not be apparently gay to most people.”142
Also, if the individual returned to Mexico in some other community other than the
one he was raised, the judge said that it would not be obvious that he was
homosexual unless he made that obvious himself.143 It was because of this lack of
visibility, the immigration judge concluded that Soto Vega had failed to
“demonstrate a reasonable fear of future persecution.”144 The Matter of Soto Vega
was affirmed by the BIA without opinion.145
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the individual
established a past persecution on account of his sexual identity and therefore a
well-founded fear of future persecution should have been presumed established.146
When the applicant establishes this past persecution, it is then the job of the
government to rebut by showing circumstances in the country have changed or
that the individual could reasonably relocate to another part of their native
country.147 The court notes in using the phrase “must show,” the immigration
judge did not afford the individual the presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution.148 The court notes that the “clear probability” standard applies
to withholding, rather than asylum, which requires only a showing of a reasonable
141
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possibility.149 For that reason the court remanded back to the BIA to determine
whether the government had properly rebutted the individual’s plea.150 If the
government rebuts the individual’s well-founded fear of future persecution by
establishing an alteration in the dynamics of the country or establishing that the
persecution is localized, then there is a legitimate foundation for denying the
individual’s claim for asylum.151 However, it is inappropriate to refuse asylum to
the victim of persecution based on his or her sexual identity because the traits of
that sexual identity are not apparent, or “obvious.”
A. Covering
The idea of a homosexual acting “normal” rather than “queer,” is known as
homosexual covering- it is the process by which gay individuals alter their conduct
to display only gender-typical traits, allowing others to ignore their sexual
orientation.152 What occurred in the case of Matter of Soto Vega is known as
reverse covering- this occurs when “straights…ask gays to perform according to
stereotype,” which is exactly what the judge in this case did.153 The idea of
reverse covering is rewarded in cases such as Hernandez-Montiel and ReyesReyes.154 Hernandez-Montiel granted asylum to a male applicant who began
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dressing and acting like a woman at the age of twelve.155 The court distinguished
this “particular social group” as a subset group of homosexuals that was made up
of “gay men with female sexual identities;” and based its decision on femaleacting homosexual men being subjected to higher levels of abuse than male-acting
homosexual men.156 In recognizing that there is a heightened level of abuse
among more feminine male homosexuals, the court is distinguishing persecution
of sexual minorities by how “gay” or “not gay” they are. Persecution is
persecution and should be treated as such. The subjectivity of the courts analysis,
relying on sights and comparison to stereotype is inappropriate in analyzing the
immutable characteristic of sexual identity. Compared with each other,
Hernandez-Montiel and Soto Vega suggest that courts perceive gay asylum
applicants on a covering spectrum, stretching from those who “act straight,” or
cover, to those who “act gay,” or reverse cover.157
Similarly, for religious asylum applicants, courts have considered whether
the petitioner’s religion can be “readily identified.”158 Courts have observed that,
like the other enumerated categories, the attributes of a particular social group
must be recognizable.159 There is no visibility requirement for asylum, but it is a
way of ascertaining whether persecution occurs “on account of” the protected
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characteristic.160 In general, there must be a nexus between the applicant’s
persecution and his or her protected characteristic.161 In order to fill this
requirement, courts have suggested that as a base, it is necessary that “the
persecutor could become aware” of the protected characteristic.162
In the case of homosexuals, this requirement of visibility becomes
somewhat of a predicament. For many homosexuals, the visibility of their
sexuality is inversely related to the fear that they feel as an individual; when fear
increases, visibility of their homosexuality decreases.163 A study of homosexual
persecution in Egypt revealed how an increasing public awareness that “colored
underwear, long hair, and tattoos were all telltale signs” of homosexuality, and
that led gay individuals to avoid these attributes.164 Additionally, a case involving
a gay couple from Bangladesh, required the pair to “conduct themselves in a
discreet manner,”165 because being visible would lead to “the possibility of being
bashed by the police.”166 In these situations, it is the invisibility of sexuality rather
than the visibility that acts as the nexus between the individual’s fear of
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persecution and their homosexuality.167 If covering is considered a burden on the
individual because they are required to hide their true identity for fear of
persecution, then any voluntary covering is then arguably evidence that wellfounded fear exists.168 When fear of persecution forces a sexual minority to
conform to the life of a straight person, “covering” infringes on conversion, which
has been seen by American courts as persecution that meets the fear-based
standard.169
In the concepts of asylum law, one is either homosexual, or not- (a member
of a particular social group).170 Under asylum law, homosexuality is not treated as
a behavior that lies on a gradual scale; but it is an immutable trait, unchangeable in
nature.171 “An immutability- based legal standard for those persecuted on the
basis of their sexual orientation must recognize that while some gay people are
capable of resisting any expression of that orientation, they are still gay and not
necessarily free from fear of persecution.”172
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In Matter of Acosta, the BIA defined an immutable characteristic as one
that individuals “either cannot change, or should not be required to change.”173 It
is the inability of gay men to change their core sexual identity, separate from
action, that immigration courts have consistently recognized, hence the inherent
immutability in the trait.174 The problem is, when courts use a performance model
and incorrectly assume that homosexual identity is constituted by action, they
remove the immutable nature of the trait. Additionally, it is ironic that
homosexuals have been denied because their sexual orientation is not apparent and
in the case of Amanfi v. Ashcroft, a heterosexual individual was perceived to be
gay and thus was granted asylum based on persecution from this perception.175 In
essence, a heterosexual was homosexual enough at this point to qualify for
asylum, yet in these cases that involve reverse covering, a homosexual may be
denied asylum based on lack of perception he is the person he claims to be.176
This is just a roundabout way of saying to those who are victimized, “if you can
hide it, then do it - problem solved.” This idea would be unheard of if said straight
forwardly; but essentially that is all these decisions amount to. Homosexuality
was not originally enumerated, nor has homosexuality been as implemented in our
society as it is today; but placed under the context of religion, roundabout or
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straightforward, the notion of covering or reverse covering would be unthinkable
if suggested. With a firm defense under the First Amendment, and an enumerated
group in asylum law, telling someone to hide their religion if they can to avoid
persecution is unthinkable and the same thought process should be used by the
court in their review of asylum cases based on sexual identity.
CONCLUSION
So what does all of this interpretation and expansion mean? Sexual and gender
minorities seeking asylum for persecution place the courts between a rock and a
hard place. The alien applicants must possess a genuine fear of persecution and
there has to be a reasonable possibility that the persecution will occur.177 They
have to establish that they are being individually targeted for persecution or that
they are being persecuted because of their association with “a particular social
group,” one that has not yet been defined in most cases for these minorities.178
The Attorney General has stipulated after much debate, that though not
enumerated as one of the original categories, homosexuality does constitute a
“particular social group,” under which individuals suffering persecution because
of their association with the group, may seek asylum.179 Though this is progress, it
isn’t enough. “Homosexual” as understood by the courts, does not automatically
connote “sexual or gender minority.” Theses individuals who don’t fit the binary
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system of gay male/female, or straight male/female, are going to have a much
more difficult time establishing their connection with a particular social group
under which they asylum may be claimed. So where do we look? Well the circuit
spilt of interpretation of course.
The First,180 Third,181 and Seventh Circuits182 require the particular group
the alien claims they're a part of, share a common immutable characteristic.
Immutable to these courts means unchangeable and ingrained, this presents a
problem for individuals whose “particular social group,” is made up of people who
can remove their outward expressions. The Ninth Circuit however, in saying that
if the individuals are united by voluntary association or an innate characteristic
that is fundamental to their identity and it cannot or should not be changed, well
then they qualify as a “particular social group.”183 This standard allows for the
individual, if represented by an outward expression of their inner core identity, to
be protected from persecution because it is a fundamental piece of who they are as
a person. These traits should be accepted even if they have been acquired
overtime as the individual accepted and associated with their true identity.184 This
brightens the possibilities for sexual minorities, because hypothetically, even if the
individual is a straight sounding, masculine mannered male, but they wear
woman’s clothing because they are transgender, and their identity is a straight
180
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female trapped in a man’s body; this outward expression of their core gender
identity should allow them to claim asylum under a particular social group if
persecuted, and be granted asylum because of who they are at their core.
The Second Circuit analyzes the perception of the persecutor.185 If someone is
persecuted because of who they are perceived to be and that perception is
incorrect, they should still be able to claim asylum under that particular social
group. This standard is important. We incorporate it into our domestic
protections so why not integrate it into our international protections?186 If identity
is imputed based on the perceptions of another, those perceptions should be
protected against regardless of their truth when it comes to the individual’s actual
identity.187 This will allow for those who may not have come to terms with how to
identify themselves, and those who simply don’t understand the concept of sexual
deviation, but know that this sexual or gender difference is core to their person, or
has been recognized and imputed upon them because of the perceptions of
someone else; they should be afforded the ability to seek asylum protection,
because the alternative is victimization for something that they cannot control.
That is the overlying idea that the courts must remember in moving forward
when looking at asylum based on sexual and gender minority; the theme among
these individuals, regardless of what “particular social group” of sexual or gender
differentiation they associate themselves with, just like members of the
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enumerated categories, the alternative to acceptance is victimization with the
possibility of death. A fusion between the standard of the Second Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit would provide the most alternatives for sexual and gender based
asylum seekers, enumerating for non-immutable but still innate characteristics and
the perceptions of the persecutor not just the identity of the victim. These
decisions should never be made on the basis of what outward exhibition is being
made versus what characteristics seem to suggest that they can hide their true
identity.188 The risk with this and one that surely has caused the courts to be so
tentative in expanding the definitions of what constitutes “a particular social
group” in relation to the non-physical characteristics of sexual and gender
minorities; is lying. It is hard to lie in regards to race, religion, nationality, and
even political association; however, the greatest risk to a broad interpretation of
the standard is lying. There is no answer to solving this problem and it revolves
around trust. When looking at evidence of persecution, the applicant’s testimony
is sufficient. The courts trust the applicant to tell a truthful story that establishes
fear upon which they seek asylum. That same trust is what must move the courts
forward to broaden the interpretation of how someone can associate with a
particular social group and what would constitute the creation of that group. There
will be individuals who will try to take advantage of this system, but in order for
sexual and gender minorities to receive adequate protection from persecution
based on these immutable or innate characteristics; the courts need to trust that
188
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those seeking asylum are doing so because they have a well-founded fear of
persecution and possible death for being who they are.
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